主 题：Does State Ownership Harm Corporate Governance?Evidence from Corporate Misconduct（国有股权损害了公司治理吗？）
This study proposes that firms with high state ownership are less likely to commit corporate misconduct because managers of such firms lack the motivation to engage in corporate misconduct. Furthermore, board political connections reinforce the negative relationship between state ownership and corporate misconduct whereas pro-market reforms attenuate such a negative relationship. We also examine whether firms with high state ownership are more likely to dismiss CEOs subsequent to corporate misconduct. Using a sample of Chinese publicly-traded firms, we find empirical support for our arguments. Our conceptual arguments and empirical findings advance research on state ownership and corporate misconduct.
师伟教授现任印第安纳大学凯利商学院战略管理助理教授。2004年于北京外国语大学获得文学学位，2010于美国杜兰大学获得工商管理硕士学位，2016年于美国莱斯大学获得管理学博士学位。他的主要研究领域为公司治理、高管团队和公司战略。博士毕业仅仅一年的他目前已在国际顶级战略期刊Strategic Management Journal发表六篇论文。他的研究成果还发表在Journal of Corporate Finance, Global Strategy Journal，Human Resource Management和 Academy of Management Perspective。